In a recent issue of this Journal' two officials of Cook County 2 propound universal solutions for the "pinball problem" in three alternative draft statutes, one wiping out the industry altogether, one consisting of some three thousand words of fine print about licensing and inspection, and the third being a do-it-yourself revision of the second. All prior legislative drafting attempts in this area, the authors say, have failed. All regulatory measures aimed at letting the industry survive without their proposed inspectional provisions are, they conclude, doomed to failure.
Total prohibition of all pinball games appeals to these authors most because (1) it makes the legislative drafting "very simple," (2) it would impose "almost no burden" on the police, (3) it would only ruin those connected with the industry (unless they find something else to manufacture and sell)-and that, after all, is a disadvantage "almost entirely economic," and (4) nobody but "certain segments of our society" would be thereby deprived of any possible amusement benefits.
Let it be conceded at the outset that there is a "pinball problem" and that it is an aggravated problem in Illinois. Illinois is one of the last jurisdictions where gambling pinballs, successors to I Bilek and Ganz, The Pinball Problem-Alternative Solutions, 56 J. Crnt. L., C. & P.S. 432 (1965 199, 201-3 (1964) .
the 'one-armed bandit, 3 still flourish openly.
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Cook County is one of the few metropolitan areas that has not done anything-at least not anything effective-about them.' Let it be conceded also that the makers of amtusement pinball games and those who distribute and operate them do not claim to benefit society on any gigantic scale; they merely provide, for a pittance, a few moments' spritely entertainment to those who patronize their machines-though in truth the products of this amusement industry look pretty good in the company of those who fill the airwaves with bland idiocy, purvey smut and trash to the quasiliterate, grind out C-minus titillation for the screen, and drench the American public with toxic substances like nicotine and ethyl alcohol. If my readers hold the article I am discussing beside this one and expect an error-by-error refutation, they must face disappointment. If I under-took that, we would get only as far as the eighth word in the first line (pinball machines are not electronic, they are electro-mechanical), and progress thereafter would at at a similar pace. Instead I shall try to dispel the Alice-in-Wonderland atmosphere these authors have created 6 -of indistinguishable "machinery shells," and "honest lessors ' 7 dealing with "crooked lessees," and searches a la Henry v. United States 5 within the confines of a pinball light box-by describing briefly some of the controlling realities in this field. First, all United States pinball machines are produced in the Chicago area, in Cook County, by a handful of manufacturers who make no secret of what they put into their products.
Second, one type of machine, produced by one company, is designed and manufactured for gambling operations, and despite protestations to the contrary, for nothing else. (1959) ]. The operator, not the location owner, is the organizer and promoter of gambling on the local scene, the putative briber of officials, and the man whose "territory" may be extended and protected by "muscle." Yet Bilek and Ganz are touchingly solicitous about him: "The honest lessor saddled with a crooked lessee needs to be protected." (Bilek and Ganz, supra note 1 at 438.) Their weird revocation-of-consent procedure (Id., 444) , seemingly unprecedented in gambling-law draftsmanship, would let the operator elect whether he wanted his machines destroyed in the event they were seized, or whether he wanted to put them away until the "heat was off." Cf., MODEL ANTIGgkmla2No AcT (Nat'l. Conf. of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 1952). 8361 U. S. 98 (1959) , where FBI agents, stalking Henry for possessing stolen whisky, learned after they arrested him that what he really possessed was radios, and discovered some hours after that that the radios were stolen. If the selection of this authority reflects careful scholarship by Bilek and Ganz, it does indeed illuminate their understanding of the "pinball problem," for the controlling fact was that the agents made their observations "from a distance of some 300 feet" and could not determine anything about the size, number or contents of the cartons containing the radios. 361 U. S. 98, 99. For a recent and faultless application of the law of seizure in a gambling device (punch board) case, see People v. McDonald, 26 Ill. 2d 325, 186 N. E. 2d 303, (1962 Third, all other pinball machines now marketed by the industry are machines of types designed and manufactured merely to vend amusement, are incapable of being used to promote gambling, 10 and have never been (in thirty years' experience with them) so used.' Fourth, to convert an amusement pinball game into a gambling device is only possible in the sense that one could rebuild a moppet sports car into a ten-ton truck (and no such makeshift conversion has ever been encountered in the entire history of the industry) . Super. 28, 192 A. 2d 240 (1963); State v. Bally Beach Club Pinball Machine, 119 A. 2d 876 (Vt., 1956) .
10 Though they can, of course, be used for bets among players, competing in this sense with the U. S. Mint and the service it has long rendered to coin-flippers, coin-matchers, and coin-tossers. See, Johnson v. Phinney, 218 F. 2d 303, 308 (5th Cir. 1955) . In one Cook County suburb (Skokie) amusement pinballs are currently the subject of a hue-and-cry on the testimony of a 15-year-old housebreaker whose confession was revealed (and quoted) to the press as follows: "85 per cent of [the loot] 'I fed into pinball machines. I know guys that go into their mothers' purses and take money for use in pinball machines,' the boy told police.
'These machines are often used for gambling, too. By gambling, I mean two boys play for a penny a point, so that if one person wins by 1,500 points, he wins by $15. " Chicago Sun Times, November 26, 1965 . Cf. note 6 supra.
1 Though amusement games have sometimes been held to violate gambling laws in the confusion that arose in the 'thirties over the value of free games, as explained further in the text, infra at note 29. See Annot., 148 A.L.R. 879 (1944) and 89 A.L.R. 2d 815 (1963) . 12 The current "bingo" gambling machines, for example, contain approximately 7,000 feet of wiring, weigh around 400 pounds, and cost about S1300; the circuits of a typical single-player amusement game are carried by 800 feet of wire, the game weighs around 300 pounds, and its cost is in the $450 range. (On one point accuracy may be conceded to Bilek and Ganz: their prices are right). So the trouble-the "pinball problem"-is not in the physical features of the machines at all. The trouble springs from the often confused, and sometimes conceivably cynically colored, arguments that have raged around the application of old-fashioned gambling laws to these relative newcomers in the coin-machine field. And that leads us back to the story of Illinois and its great urban county on the windy lakeshore.
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Coin-operated pinball games were first built in Chicago in the early depression days. Based on the Victorian parlor game of bagatelle, the first models gave seven balls for a penny, allowing the player to shoot onto an inclined plane with numbered receptacles (literally outlined with nails or "pins"). This game (the first ones cost less than $20.00) caught the public fancy, along with midget golf, flagpole sitting, dance marathons and jigsaw puzzles.
While the new pinball industry thus thrived modestly, advancing into table models, electrically illuminated backboards, and greater complexity of play, the old slot machine manufacturers (also centered in Chicago) were falling upon harder and harder times. Despite the ingenuity of slot-machine designers, anything that applied pure chance for a wagered coin and paid out in cash or redeemable tokens was apt to be quickly pounced upon by local enforcement officers with an eye on the classic elements of gamblingconsideration, chance and prize. 16 In this era even some pinball games reached the market with coin-spewing cash payout adaptations. But they did not last long, for no court has ever been fully persuaded that the gravitymotivated descent of metal balls on a glass-covered inclined plane is devoid of chance (so, patently, 14 Excluding the eight states named in note 4 supra, and of course Illinois, about three-fourths of the rest (i.e., about 30) allow amusement pinball games without tolerating the gamblers. The remainder still have statutes or court rulings aimed variously at the free game per se, with the resulting confusion in enforcement explained further in the text, infra at note 29. See e.g., N. Y. PENAL CODE, §982.
15 Where, I am constrained to add as a further riposte, a different "physical feature" has demonstrably sometimes played a part: official eyes that will not see. they incorporated the three elements of gambling in proscribed combination). 17 However, in 1935 a Chicago pinball company came up with an amsement feature that opened new vistas for everyone. By.a simple adaptation of the coin chute, 8 a player who made a sufficient score could be allowed to set up another game without inserting another coin; by a further adaptation, high scores could be rewarded with even more free replays-any number, in fact. Here was something that added play incentive in the amusement models so their popularity zoomed; by luck and skill 19 a player could extend the amusement he had purchased so he could actually go on playing, another game or a few more games, 20 at no additional cost. And note that this offends no traditional notion of gambling. When the player finishes, he is not enriched by a prize or pay-off. When he leaves the machine he has received what he bought, the amusement inherent in the play and nothing else (comparably, bowling sometimes gives an extra frame, baseball may provide some extra-innings, a, golfer's nine includes an indeteKminate number of strokes, etc.).9
But the Chicago gambling manufacturers found a way to make use of the free game device too. On their machines (including even converted one-armed bandits) the player could win large multiples of free games. See, Chicago Patent Corp. v. Genco, Inc., 124 F. 2d 725 (7th Cir. 1941) . 19 In the early 'fifties the amasement industry added "fRippers"-small pushbutton-controlled strikers on each side of the board to allow the player to prolong the play of each ball. These are now as characteristic of amusement games as the puck to hockey or the driver to golf. They would never be found on a gambling machine, where the aim is to get the subterfuge pinball play over as quickly as possible, unless the gambling designers someday adopt them for protective coloration.
21 Amusement machines will award a maximum of two or three free replays in one game, and usually are built to accumulate 26 (which operators generally stop down to 10 or 15 (Idaho, 1965) .
22 Current "bingo" models offer up to 600 on one play and accumulate up to 999-imperatively necessary, incidentally, to provide what gamblers call the "big lick." The lure of every successful gambling promotion is the chance of a long-shot win, e.g., the traditional "jackpot" of the one-armed bandit. Discovering this feature on the backboard of a gambling pinball machine (cf. note 20 supra) can scarcely be characterized as much of a visual feat. them off-by the hundreds and by the hour if necessary.n But when the sheriff was not there, the location owner, partner in the operation with the machine owner, redeemed the games in cash, cleared the redeemed games from the machine by a circuit built into it for that purpose (which also recorded the number of games so cleared), and was later accurately reimbursed out of the proceeds when the owner opened the cash box and before the two divided the net profits.
The evolution of the gambling pinball machine, from "one-balls" to current "bingo" models, and other characteristic gambling features-the multiple coin adaptation, the "reflex unit," the simplified pinball action, etc.-have been copiously described elsewhere. But it was above all this freegame-payout subterfuge that started two lines of pin-ball machines flowing out of the Chicago manufactories, gambling and amusement versions sometimes even coming alternately from the same plant. And it was this clear dichotomy that caused the industry to split bitterly in the mid-forties, with one segment striving to make a place for itself among legitimate coin vendors while the other (now a single company) continues to market increasingly sophisticated gambling models.2
In 1895 the Illinois General Assembly made mechanical gambling devices contraband per se, in the following language:
Every clock, tape machine, slot machine or other machine or device for the reception of money on chance or upon the actions of which money is staked, hazarded, bet, won or lost is hereby declared a gambling device and shall be subject to seizure, confiscation and destruction by any municipal or other local authority within whose jurisdiction the same may be found.
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If this law embarrassed any of the manufacturers during the half-century heyday of the slot machine, when Chicago companies virtually monopolized production for the nation, there is no easily discoverable record of it. Apparently such ma- So the Illinois pinball market remained more or less closed, at least, officially, for several years after World War H-though nobody bothered the Chicago manufacturers when they pulled down their war-production "E's" and resumed the building of pinball machines in both categories for shipment out of the state.
Then in 1953 the Illinois General Assembly amended the 1895 Act. This body keeps no journals from which legislative history and legislative intent can be ascertained," but it is commonly understood that the lawmakers thought they were reopening the state to amusement games. The amendment was this:
A coin-in-the-slot-operated mechanical device played for amusement which rewards the player with the right to replay such mechanical device, which device is so constructed or devised as to make such result of the operation thereof depend in part upon the skill of the player and which returns to the player thereof no coins, tokens or merchandise shall not be considered to be a gambling device within the meaning of this Act and any right of replay so obtained shall not represent a valuable thing within the meaning of this Act. 3 ' The effect was to open the door much wider; gambling machines equipped with the free-gamepayoff subterfuge otherwise fitted the above description, and of course they did not return to the player any "coins, tokens or merchandise. uIn the Senate, 49 to 3; in the House, 118 to 1. As one editorial writer boldly ventured, "The opposition did not melt away until a rumor that certain pinball interests were -prepared to spend $50,000 to defeat the bill gained wide circulation in the state capital. Perhaps out of fear that they would be publicly linked with a suspected payoff, the foes of the measure gave up. [b] Participants in any of the following activities shall not be convicted of gambling:
(1) Agreements to... etc. §28-2. Definitions.
[a] A "gambling device" is any clock, tape machine, slot machine or other machine or device for the reception of money or other thing of value on chance or skill or upon the action of which money or other thing of value is staked, hazarded, bet, won or lost; or... A "gambling device" does not include:
(1) A coin-in-the-slot-operated mechanical device played for amusement which rewards the player with the right to replay such mechanical device, which device is so constructed or devised as to make such result of the operation thereof In this period a major change occurred in the federal pattern, affecting what was to happen next in the 1963 session of the Illinois General Assembly. The federal Johnson Act, 0 enacted in 1951 to prohibit the interstate transportation of coinoperated gambling devices, contained exactly the same loophole for free-game-payout-subterfuge pinball games as the Illinois law. The Johnson Act language was "deliver, as the result of the application of an element of chance, any money or property." (Obviously, machines which control payouts by means of free games do not deliver anything directly). This was corrected, in the federal Gaming Devices Act of 1962, enacted October 18, 1962,4 to read, "by the operation of which a person may become entitled to receive, as the result of the application of an element of chance, any money or property." The new language was aimed expressly at the gambling-type pinball machine, 49 and has been subsequently so interpreted and applied.
1
The federal act made another significant clarification in 1962. The manufacture of machines destined for foreign jurisdictions or domestic jurisdictions where such machines are lawful, though requiring registration, was excluded from the general prohibitions of the federal law.
51
Accordingly, when the 1963 session of the Illi-41 Which had earlier been goaded into action-but not much action-after a man caught tampering with a gambling pinball machine was turned over by local police to three hoodlums who almost beat him to death, e.g., "Survey Reveals Pinball Machines Flourish in Suburbs, " Chicago American, p. 1, Sept. 17, 1961. 46 Chicago Sun-Times, Feb. 10, 1963; Chicago Tribune, Feb. 18, 1963. 47 Act of Jan. 1)-(3) .
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nois General Assembly opened, with the new federal precedents, the confusion surrounding the status of manufacturers, and the structure of the newly-revised Ilinois Code to preserve, the bill introduced again to curb gambling pinballs took a form slightly different from its predecessors. It merely substituted for the words "coins, tokens, or merchandise" (italicized in the quotation of the Illinois statute above) the words "money, property, or right to receive money or property," and in its final version it added an exemption in §28-1(b) supra, as follows: (4) Manufacture of gambling devices, including the acquisition of essential parts therefor and the assembly thereof, for transportation in interstate or foreign commerce to any place outside this State when such transportation is not prohibited by any applicable Federal law. Once again the measure 2 passed both Houses with near-unanimity (though it was almost derailed by a surprise attack from the Cook County States Attorney, who denounced it publicly at the crucial last moment as "a legal paradox" and warned that it "could lead to wide-open gambling in Illinois");O and this time Governor Kerner signed it. The enacting signature was affixed July 9, 1963, and the measure was widely hailed as liberating Illinois at last from the gambling pinball operators and crimping the profits of "the syndicate."
But this was not the last word. On July 11-two days later-the Cook County Sheriff's Police made a spectacular raid on 67 premises, rounding up pinball machines by the truckload.
5 5 On July 24, in an action brought by one owner operating one machine in one location known as Ella's Grill, the Sheriff and his men were enjoined by a Superior Court judge. Ella had sworn that she knew of no pay-offs on this machine while it was in her grill.'Y The owner insisted that the $250 federal 52 73rd G. A., H. 374 (with 27 sponsors) and S. 388 (with 4 sponsors).
13 Chicago American, June 12, 1963 . The vote in tho Senate was 45 to 3; in the House there were no "nays." See note 38 supra.
" Chicago American, July 9, 1963 (editorial, July 10, 1963 Chicago Tribune, July 10, 1963; Chicago Daily News (editorial) July 11, 1963; Chicago SunTimes (editorial) July 11, 1963 . " Chicago Tribune, July 12, 1963 Chicago SunTimes, July 12, 1963. "Though the operator admitted that in Ella's modest 10-stool establishment this one machine produced profits of over $4000 per year--an average of $11.00 per day from patrons who purportedly played it for amusement! See, Brief of Chicago Crime Commisgaming device stamp obtained.for the machine was irrelevant because he had purchased it .under protest. Holding that the new amendment did not reach gambling-type pinball niachines, the judge was quoted as saying to, the prosecutor:.. "I don't know how anyone could read that into the bill. If the legislature had wanted to pass a law as you interpret it, ,they would have put it in plain language. We must take the statute as it is. We cannot add or subtract."57 Immediately following this order, leave was given Ella's attorney to join-i.e, to bring within the injunction-all other owners who had been affected by the seizure, some 50 additional parties operating 70 machines in other -locations. But though extensive testimony was taken subsequently before a master,2 none of these latecomers were ever examined to see what they might say about their operations.
The seized machines were returned, and gambling conditions in the County quickly returned to normalcy.0 The State's Attorney appealed (onthe record confined to the unconttadicted testimony of Ella and her cohorts). Dealing with theprincipal issue, whether "[returns a] right to money or property" in the Illinois amendment was intended to mean the same thing as "become entitled to receiv... money or property" in the federal version, the State's brief offered this edifying argument:
"As a further corollary to the interpretation of the 1963 amendment, it is necessary to define and analyze the literal connotation of.the term right. Contrary to the common misconception concerning that term, it is quite evident that the word right is one of the most ambiguous words in all of legal jurisprudence (Pound, Jurisprudence, Vol. 1, p. 56, 57). The broad and normal meaning of this word in its true sense, is a manifestation of a reasonable expectation involved in civilized life; a capacity of creating rather than an absolute creation or interest (Pound, Jurisprii4ence, Vol. 2, p. 56-57)."10 sion As Amicus Curiae, supra, note 34, pp. 5-Cf., note 6 supra. 57 and thereafter concluded:
The Illinois act requires that a machine meeting all the other requirements of the exception to the statutory definition of a "gambling device" be one which returns to the player thereof no money or property or right to receive money or property. In order to remove it from the exception, the device must actually "return" money or property or the right thereto. It is not sufficient that the machine may be used to return the right to money or property. Assuming, arguendo, that a gambling debt was collectible in this state, a person playing one of these machines could not bring an action to collect anything for (1959) , in Volume IV at p. 56, a general philosophical discussion of "a right" is commenced as follows:
"Meaning of the term 'a right.' There is no more ambiguous word in legal and juristic literature than the word right. In its most general sense it means a reasonable expectation involved in civilized life. As a noun, it has been used in five senses in the law books .... " The treatise then qualifies and clarifies this introduction in some thirty-five pages of Hohfeldian erudition including, at p. 57 (also in Volume IV) the following: "(3) A third use is to designate a capacity of creating, divesting or altering rights in the second sense and so of creating or altering duties. Here the proper term is 'power.' " 61 Ella's counsel, whose breeziness makes my tone in these pages sound like stuffy paraphrasing of the King James Version, rejoined, "If the Legislature did intend such an interpretation, then it should also change 'The Bill of Rights' to 'The Bill . For what comfort it might be, the court acknowledged, "We have no doubt that machines of this type can be used for gambling purposes, and considering the construction of the machine it becomes obvious that the manufacturers had this in mind, as well as a use for amusement solely. However ... the fact that they are also specially adaptable to use as gambling devices is irrelevant in the absence of any evidence proving such use."6 ' In other words, the 1963 amendment was construed to be an absolute nullity, 6 5 and law enforcement officers were back where they started under the 1895 Act-able (and, it might also be noted, obliged) to seize a machine only if they actually happened to see a pay-off being made on it.66
During this same period, pinball gambling operations had been seriously threatened by a rule of the Illinois Liquor Control Commission providing that purchase of a $250 Federal Gaming Device Stamp for a licensed premises would be grounds for suspension or revocation. This rule was promptly challenged, and early in 1964 the Supreme Court of Illinois held it invalid, on the ground that (making no reference to the 1963 amendment of §28-2), ".... it is the view in this jurisdiction that a pinball machine is not a gaming device per se since its use may be solely for entertainment purposes" and that the Commission was apparently drawing an irrebuttable presumption from purchase of such a stamp, instead of a rebuttable one. Calderwoud, 33 Ill. App. 541, 77 N. E. 2d 849 (1948) . 66 Sheriff's police seized 9 machines on this basis in Cook County in August, 1964 . Chicago Sun-Times, Aug. 9, 1964 . This was followed by an I.R.S. raid in which Treasury agents seized 41 more which they found operating without the current $250 federal gaming device stamp. Chicago Sun-Times, Aug. 20, 1964; Chicago Tribune, Aug. 20, 1964. 67 The Bilek-Ganz proposals ignore both the federal gaming-device stamp tax and the vulnerability of licensed premises to lose anything more than their right to keep pinball machines (for one year). Bilek and Ganz, note 1, supra at 444-5. The $250 federal stamp must already be registered with local authori- Sept. 11, 1964. 70 So the pinball gamblers were once more operating in the clear (and always in the black-revenues from these machines in Cook County alone, conservatively estimated from the number publicly listed as operating there at this writing, run in the range of S175,000 per month).
But the action now shifts to a new quarter. In the fall of 1964, with an eye on the forthcoming 1965 legislative session, the Mayor of Chicago (in whose urban jurisdiction all pinballs have been banned since 1931)7 announced the formation of a blue-ribbon committee of public officials and civic leaders to work up a set of new anti-crime measures "designed to make a criminal's life in Illinois a little more miserable."
2 Early in December, 1964, this committee approved work on fourteen draft bills, covering everything from wiretapping to Molotov cocktails; and one of the fourteen was a revision of §28-2, in yet another attempt to reach the gambling pinballs. The draftsmen assigned to this pinball bill were skillful lawyers, and what they produced was a rewording which would have made the applicable provisions of §28-2 read as follows:
Sec. 28-2. Definitions. (a) A "gambling device" is any clock, tape machine, slot machine or other machines or device for the reception of money or other thing of value on chance or skill or upon the action of which money or other thing of value is staked, hazarded, bet, won or lost; any other machine or mechanical device designed and manufactured primarily for use in connection with gambling,
